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Abstract 
 
The so-called ‘fatal five’ behaviours (drink and drug driving, distraction and 
inattention, speeding, fatigue, and failure to wear a seat belt) are known to be the 
major behavioural contributory factors to road trauma. However, little is known 
about the factors that lead to drivers engaging in each behaviour. This article 
presents the findings from a study which collected and analysed data on the factors 
that lead to drivers engaging in each behaviour. This involved a survey of drivers’ 
perceptions of the causes of each behaviour and a subject matter expert workshop 
to gain the views of road safety experts. The results were mapped onto a systems 
ergonomics model of the road transport system in Queensland, Australia, to show 
where in the system the factors reside. In addition to well-known factors relating to 
drivers’ knowledge, experience and personality, additional factors at the higher 
levels of the road transport system related to road safety policy, transport system 
design, road rules and regulations, and societal issues were identified. It is concluded 
that the fatal five behaviours have a web of interacting contributory factors 
underpinning them and are systems problems rather than driver-centric problems. 
The implications for road safety interventions are discussed. 
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Introduction 
The term ‘systems thinking’ describes a philosophy currently prevalent within safety 
science that provides expansive theories and methods to support accident analysis 
and prevention activities (e.g. Leveson, 2004; Perrow, 1984; Rasmussen, 1997). 
Whilst there are various tenets, contemporary models are underpinned by the 
notion that safety and accidents are emergent properties arising from non-linear 
interactions between multiple components across entire systems (e.g. Leveson, 
2004). This creates a shared responsibility for accidents that spans all levels of 
systems, up to and including the government.  
 
In the last decade, the potential utility of applying systems thinking in road safety 
research and practice has been recognised (Larsson et al., 2010; Salmon and Lenné, 
2009; Salmon et al., 2012). There is now a growing consensus that further reductions 
in trauma may be achieved by applying systems thinking approaches in road safety 
(Hughes et al., 2016; Larsson et al., 2010; Salmon and Lenné, 2015). This is becoming 
increasingly relevant given the recent plateau in fatality and injury reductions in 
many jurisdictions, as well as the fact that in many countries the road toll is 
increasing. In Australia, for example, from 2015 to 2016 the number of fatalities per 
100,000 population increased by 6%. This trend appears to be continuing in 2017 
(BITRE, 2017). Systems thinking proponents argue that existing approaches have 
reached a ceiling in terms of effectiveness and are now experiencing diminishing 
returns. This is due to the changing nature and increasing complexity of road 
transport systems (Hughes et al., 2016; Larrson et al., 2010; Salmon and Lenné, 
2015). 
4 
 
 
The traditional road safety approach involves the “3 Es” of education, enforcement, 
and engineering. Examples of this approach can be seen in the interventions used to 
address the so-called ‘fatal five’ behaviours known to lead to crashes and road 
trauma: drug and drink driving, distraction and inattention, failure to wear a seat 
belt, speeding, and fatigue. Generally, key interventions use education, 
enforcement, or engineering with the intention of improving road user knowledge 
and behaviour so that engagement in the fatal five behaviours is reduced. Critics of 
this approach have focussed on its reductionist basis, whereby the road transport 
system is artificially isolated from its broader environment (e.g. society), broken into 
smaller, discrete parts (e.g. road users, vehicles, and roads) and attempts are made 
to optimise these parts under the assumption that the system will perform better as 
a result. Many have also argued that there are contributory factors outside of the 
driver, vehicle and road infrastructure that cannot be addressed through the 3 Es 
(Hughes et al., 2016; Newnam & Goode, 2015; Salmon et al., 2012, 2016). 
 
Systems thinking proponents argue that the behaviour of road users is impacted by 
many other factors and that there is a complex web of interacting factors that lead 
to drivers engaging in the fatal five behaviours (Salmon et al., 2016). Although some 
of these factors relate to the individual driver (e.g. personality, risk tolerance, 
complacency), others likely reside elsewhere in the road transport system (e.g. at 
the governance and regulatory level). As a result, education, enforcement and 
engineering will have some impact; however, systemic factors will not be dealt with 
and so drivers will continue to engage in undesirable behaviours, albeit perhaps to a 
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slightly lesser extent. A final important element of systems thinking is that the 
behaviour of road users can be influenced by factors extrinsic to the road transport 
system itself. This suggests, for example, that broader societal issues may also be 
playing a key role in drivers’ engagement in certain fatal five behaviours (e.g. drug 
and drink driving). 
 
In response to calls for a better understanding of the factors that create road 
trauma, researchers have applied systems theory-based methods to investigate the 
causes of road trauma and to design new interventions (e.g. Cornelissen et al., 2013; 
Hughes et al., 2016; Newnam and Goode, 2015; Newnam et al., 2017; Parnell et al., 
2017; Salmon et al., 2014, 2016). The overriding philosophy is that the entire road 
transport system needs to be optimised, not just the individual components acting 
within it (e.g. road users, vehicles). Whilst initial crash studies have shed new light on 
the system-wide causes of road trauma, a criticism is that many have focussed only 
on a single crash event or on existing crash data only (e.g. Newnam and Goode, 
2015; Newnam et al., 2017; Salmon et al., 2013). Notably, existing crash data 
systems have not been able to provide data on crash contributory factors outside of 
the road user, their vehicle, and the road environment. This has impacted the 
generalizability and validity of findings and has raised the requirement for further 
research utilising other data sources (Salmon and Lenné, 2015; Salmon et al., 2016). 
 
This article describes a study designed to go beyond limited accident data and 
investigate the factors that influence drivers’ engagement in the fatal five 
behaviours. The study involved the use of a driver survey and an expert workshop to 
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gather data on drivers’ and road safety experts’ perceptions of the causes of the 
fatal five behaviours. The findings from both were then mapped onto a recently 
developed systems model of the road transport system in Queensland (Qld), 
Australia (Salmon et al., 2016). The aim was to identify: (a) what factors lead to 
drivers engaging in each of the fatal five behaviours; and, (b) where these factors 
reside in the road transport system. The intention was to identify areas of the road 
transport system outside of drivers, vehicles and the road environment that would 
benefit from interventions designed to reduce crashes associated with the fatal five 
behaviours. 
 
Road transport ‘systems’ 
A contribution of systems thinking-based road safety research has been to provide 
detailed models of road transport systems. These models depict road transport 
systems as a series of hierarchical levels comprising multiple interacting stakeholders 
(Parnell et al., 2017; Salmon et al., 2016; Young et al., 2015). As well as road users, 
their vehicles their environment and widely known road safety stakeholders, these 
models also include various other actors and organisations involved in transport 
system design and operation all the way up to and including the government. A key 
implication is that crash contributory factors reside across these actors and levels of 
the system; however, it has been consistently noted that data relating to these 
contributory factors is sparse (Salmon and Lenné, 2015). 
 
A limitation of existing systems analysis models is that they only describe the road 
transport system of interest and do not consider where in the road transport system 
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crash contributory factors reside. The study described in this article addresses this by 
building on previous work undertaken by the authors in which a systems model of 
the Qld road transport system was developed (Salmon et al., 2016). Salmon et al’s 
(2016) control structure model of the Qld road transport system shows the actors 
and organisations who operate within it along with the control and feedback 
relationships that exist between them. The present study is an important extension 
to Salmon et al.’s work as the original model does not include any data on the 
factors that contribute to road crashes. A key requirement for implementing systems 
thinking in road safety research is to use systems analysis models to identify crash 
contributory factors as well as where these reside in the road transport system. 
Whilst much is known about contributory factors related to drivers, vehicles, and the 
road infrastructure, few studies have examined contributory factors from the higher 
levels of the road transport system (Larsson et al., 2010; Salmon et al., 2012; Salmon 
and Lenne, 2015). The original model presented in Salmon et al (2016) therefore 
provides a suitable framework to support identification of such factors. The present 
study involved identifying such factors and them determining which level of the 
model they are associated with. 
 
Salmon et al.’s original model, including system design and construction and system 
operations control structures, is presented in Figure 1 and a description of each of 
the levels from the operations side is presented in Table 1. Within Figure 1, 
downward pointing arrows and associated text represent control mechanisms 
imposed by actors and/or organisations at the level above on actors and/or 
organisations at the level below. For example, police officers at Level 4 impose 
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control on the road users at Level 5 via monitoring, enforcement and penalties. 
Likewise, at Level 1 federal and state parliaments impose control on the level below 
(government agencies, industry associations, user groups, and the courts) through 
legislation. Control relationships also exist between non-adjacent levels (as 
represented by curved arrows). For example, the Department of Transport and Main 
Roads, situated at Level 3, imposes licensing and registration controls on road users 
at Level 5. 
 
The dashed arrows pointing upwards represent feedback mechanisms whereby 
actors and organisations provide information regarding the status of the system to 
the levels above. For example, 'Government reports' are a feedback mechanism 
provided by Level 2 (government agencies, industry associations, user groups and 
the courts) to Level 1 (parliament and legislatures). Crash reports are provided to 
police officers (Level 4) by road users (Level 5) who were either involved in the crash 
or witnessed the crash. Feedback mechanisms exist between adjacent levels of the 
control structure (shown by straight dashed arrows) and between non-adjacent 
levels (shown by curved dashed arrows).
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Figure 1. Queensland road transport system operations control structure (Source: Salmon et al., 2016) 
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Table 1. Queensland road transport system operations STAMP control structure levels (Salmon 
et al., 2016) 
Level  Description  
Level 1: Parliament & legislatures  Actors at this level include the state and federal parliaments, Ministers with 
transport portfolios, government committees and councils (including COAG – 
the Council of Australia Governments) and federal research funding bodies 
(such as the Australian Research Council and the National Health and Medical 
Research Council). 
Level 2: Government agencies, user 
groups, industry associations, 
courts, universities 
Government agencies as well as regulators, industry associations and user 
groups and the courts reside at this level. Such actors are generally enacted by 
legislation or hope to influence the legislatures. A key government 
organisation at this level is the QLD Department of Transport and Main Roads 
(TMR). 
Level 3: Operational delivery and 
management 
The operational delivery and management level includes a range of 
organisations who are involved in road transport operations including the 
operational divisions of TMR (responsible for driver licensing, vehicle 
registration, etc.), as well as employers of professional drivers (such as heavy 
vehicle drivers, bus drivers, taxi drivers, etc.). It also includes groups such as 
ANCAP (who provides consumer safety ratings of new and used cars), 
hospitals (who collect and classify data about injuries following crashes), 
research groups and the media.  
Level 4: Local management and 
supervision  
This level includes the actors that can directly supervise and/or influence the 
driving process (e.g. the Police, parents, friends and peers) as well as actors 
such as the emergency services, schools, supervisors in the workplace, traffic 
controllers who direct drivers during roadworks, workers in the traffic 
management centre and vehicle mechanics / inspectors.  
Level 5: Operating process and 
environment 
The operating process for the road transport system is defined as the 
interaction of road users with vehicles and vehicle systems. This occurs 
through road users manipulating controls within the vehicle and gaining 
information about the vehicle’s functioning via displays. Also included are 
other road users and their vehicles and the road and related infrastructure.  
 
 
 
 
 
The control structure model suggests that there are likely multiple interacting factors 
that the lead to drivers engaging in the fatal five behaviours (related to 
inappropriate, deficient, or absent control and feedback mechanisms) and that these 
factors will span all levels of the system. The present study aimed to identify what 
these factors are and where they reside within the Qld road transport system. These 
aims were achieved through the conduct of two studies: 
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1. Survey of road user perceptions on the causes of each fatal five behaviour. 
Participants completed surveys designed to elicit their perceptions on why 
drivers engage in each of the fatal five behaviours; and 
2. Road safety subject matter expert workshop. Six road safety experts took part 
in a workshop designed to elicit their perceptions on the causes of each fatal 
five behaviour. 
 
The use of both a driver survey and expert workshop was necessary to ensure that 
comprehensive data regarding the factors influencing driver engagement in each 
behaviour was obtained. Specifically, the authors felt the use of one approach alone 
would provide only a limited view. For example, with little appreciation or 
understanding of what the overall road system comprises, it was felt that drivers 
would be unlikely to understand the role of wider systemic factors in influencing 
their behaviour. This is consistent with Leveson’s (2004) argument that people have 
limited process models of the system in which they operate. However, with their 
day-to-day experience within the system, it was felt that their views would provide 
valid local examples of the factors that influence driver behaviour. In relation to the 
workshop, it was felt that eliciting the views of road safety experts with experience 
in systems thinking research alone may lead to an overemphasis on identifying wider 
systemic factors as opposed to driver-related factors. The combination of the expert 
workshop and the driver survey enabled us to build a picture of how the wider 
systemic factors influence the lived experience of drivers as users of the system. 
 
Study 1 – Driver Survey  
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Design 
An online voluntary and anonymous survey study was used to gather data on 
drivers’ perceptions of the factors that influence engagement in each of the fatal five 
behaviours. A convenience sampling approach was adopted. Formal approval for the 
study was granted by the University of the Sunshine Coast’s research ethics 
committee. 
 
Participants 
Participants were 316 residents of Qld, Australia, who held a valid full driving licence. 
A summary of participants’ gender, age, time spent living in Qld, and driving 
experience is presented in Table 2. The majority of participants were aged between 
41 and 70, had over 20 years driving experience, and had resided in Qld for over 20 
years.  
 
 
Table 2. Survey participant demographics 
Gender Age Years lived in Qld Years driving experience 
Male 53% 
Female 47% 
18-25 16.0% 
26-49 18.4% 
41-55 31.3% 
56-70 38.2% 
<1 year 2.4% 
1-5 years 6.0% 
6-10 years 7.9% 
10-15 years 9.8% 
16-20 years 6.0% 
20-25 years 11.7% 
26+ years 53.8% 
<1 year 3.5% 
1-5 years 10.4% 
6-10 years 8.2% 
10-15 years 13.3% 
16-20 years 7.3% 
20-25 years 11.1% 
26+ years 45.2% 
 
Materials 
The survey instrument was developed and presented using the Survey Monkey 
online questionnaire platform. For the purposes of this study, drink and drug driving 
was decomposed into ‘drink driving’, ‘drug driving (illegal drugs)’ and ‘drug driving 
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(legal drugs)’. Driving without a seatbelt was subdivided into ‘driving without a 
seatbelt’ and ‘driving without using child restraints’. This yielded the following ‘fatal 
five’ behaviours that were included in the survey: 
 
1. Driving whilst fatigued; 
2. Drink and drug driving 
A. Driving with a Blood Alcohol Content (BAC) above the current legal limit 
of 0.05;  
B. Driving under the influence of illegal drugs (including cannabis); 
C. Driving under the influence of legal drugs (prescription or over-the-
counter medications that impair driving ability); 
3. Distraction and inattention;  
4. Speeding; and  
5. Driving while unrestrained 
A. Failure to wear a seat belt; and 
B. Failure to use child restraints. 
 
Following demographic questions (e.g. age, driving experience), participants were 
asked the following four questions regarding each of the eight behaviours (the 
example below relates to fatigue, however, the wording was the same across the 
eight behaviours): 
 
1. Have you ever driven while you were (or suspected you were) fatigued? 
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2. Thinking about a time that you, or someone you know, drove when they 
were fatigued, please briefly describe the reason/s for engaging in fatigued 
driving. 
3. In general, what do you think are the reasons why people drive while they 
are fatigued? 
4. What do you think could be done to prevent people driving while they are 
fatigued? 
 
Open-ended questions were used as the purpose of the survey was to gather data 
on participants’ own perceptions of what factors influence drivers to engage in each 
behaviour. The study was advertised via a mailing list and on social media including 
the research centre’s Facebook and Twitter pages. The mailing list is one that is 
maintained by the lead author’s research centre and contains details of participants 
who have participated in our previous road safety research studies. The Facebook 
advertising feature was also used to advertise the study on the news feeds of 
potential participants who met the inclusion criteria of living in Queensland, 
Australia and being aged 18 years or over. Interested participants were directed to 
the survey via a web link that was open between April–June 2016. Upon completion, 
participants were invited to enter a prize draw. 
 
Procedure 
Participant responses were subject to content analysis using NVivo 11. Responses 
were coded using a thematic analysis approach (Braun and Clarke, 2006). This 
involved coding participants’ responses to each question descriptively, and then 
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identifying, explaining, and recording patterns and themes within the data. For 
example, for the question, “In general, what do you think are the reasons why 
people drive while they are fatigued?” the response “think crashing won’t happen to 
them” was coded as “Complacency / Optimism bias”.   
 
To establish the reliability and validity of the coding scheme, inter-rater reliability 
checks were conducted. This involved the use of a second analyst who coded 20% of 
the survey responses for seven of the eight behaviours. Percentage agreement 
between the two analysts was calculated by comparing the second analyst’s coding 
with the corresponding coding from the first analyst. Agreement between the two 
analysts ranged from 75.2% (drink driving) to 91.7% (driving without using child 
restraints). Any disagreements were discussed between the analysts and agreed 
codes were used in the final data set.  
 
The coded items were subsequently mapped by two authors onto Salmon et al.’s 
(2016) control structure, based on the level at which each factor was deemed to 
reside. For example, the response “Stupidity / Ignorance” as a reason why drivers 
drive whilst under the influence of alcohol was added to Level 5 of the model 
(Operating process: Driving) as it resides within the drivers themselves, whereas the 
response, “Unreasonable speed limits” was added to the level 3 of the model 
(Operational delivery and management) as the road rules and regulations are set by 
actors at this level (e.g. Department of Transport and Main Roads, Local Councils). 
 
Results 
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Engagement in the fatal five behaviours 
Participants’ self-reported prevalence of engagement in each behaviour whilst 
driving is presented in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Participants’ reported engagement in each of the eight behaviours known to lead to road 
trauma (n=316). 
 
The highest self-reported prevalence was for speeding, with just over three-quarters 
of participants reporting having previously driven above the speed limit (76.9%). 
Driving while fatigued or distracted/inattentive also had a high prevalence, with 
approximately two-thirds of participants reporting these behaviours (66.5% and 
66.1%). Around a third of participants (32.3%) reported having previously driven 
with a blood alcohol content of 0.05 or above (the current legal limit in Qld). Almost 
a quarter of participants reported having previously driven without wearing a 
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seatbelt (23.4%) and almost a tenth reported driving with children who were not 
appropriately restrained (9.5%). Around a tenth of participants reported that they 
had previously driven whilst under the influence of illegal drugs (10%) or legal (12%) 
drugs that can impair driving performance.  
 
Factors leading to drivers engaging in the fatal five behaviours 
Questions 2 and 3 asked participants to describe the reasons why they, or somebody 
they knew, engaged in each behaviour whilst driving and generally what they 
thought were the reasons why people drove whilst engaging in each behaviour. 
 
Due to the high number of factors reported by participants (as identified via the 
thematic coding), only those reported by over 10% of the sample are presented. A 
summary of these factors is presented Table 3.  
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Table 3. Reasons for each behaviour reported by 10% or more of the survey sample (n=316). Bold percentages refer to the percentage of the sample reporting each reason. 
Fatigue Drink Driving Drug Driving Distraction & 
Inattention 
Speeding Restraint Use 
Time pressure 27% 
Work requirements 18% 
Do not recognise 
impaired 18% 
Necessity of driving 16% 
Shift work 14% 
Long trips 13% 
Family & social 
expectations 10% 
Lack of understanding of 
risks 31% 
Complacency/ 
Optimism bias 30% 
Lack of alternative 
transport options 23% 
Impaired judgement 
17% 
Perception that they 
won’t get caught 17% 
Unaware that they are 
over limit 17% 
Social and cultural 
influences 17% 
Stupidity/Ignorance 15% 
Necessity of driving 11% 
Short distance/close to 
home 11% 
Illegal drugs: 
Irresponsible 22% 
Impaired judgement 
17% 
Perception that they 
won’t get caught 16% 
Do not recognise 
impaired 15% 
Stupidity/Ignorance 15% 
Addiction 10% 
Legal drugs: 
Necessity of driving 16% 
Lack of alternative 
transport options 13% 
Do not recognise 
impaired 11% 
Complacency/ Optimism 
bias 11% 
Mobile phones 48%  
Interactions with 
children in vehicle 27% 
Passenger interactions 
generally 23% 
Lack of attention 
generally 16% 
Radio/stereo 15% 
Emotions/Stress 14% 
Complacency/Optimism 
bias 11% 
Impairment 11% 
Lack of awareness 
regarding speed 29% 
In a hurry 20% 
Late 19% 
Unreasonable speed 
limits 17% 
Considered non-
compliance 15% 
Overtaking 13% 
Impatience 13% 
Seatbelts: 
Laziness 20% 
Stupidity/Ignorance 16% 
Short trip 14% 
Forgetfulness 13% 
Discomfort 11% 
Child restraints: 
Cost of fitting restraints 
23% 
Laziness 15% 
Stupidity/Ignorance 11% 
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The majority of the contributory factors reported by survey participants were 
personal factors relating to drivers, such as stupidity/ignorance, emotions and stress, 
lack of understanding of the risks, impairment, complacency/optimism bias, 
perception of not being caught, and laziness. Participants also reported a selection of 
factors concerned with the wider road transport system and even society generally. 
These included mobile phones (distraction), social and cultural issues (drink driving), 
a lack of alternative transport options (drink and drug driving), work requirements 
and shift work (fatigue), unreasonable speed limits (speeding), and the cost of fitting 
restraints (failing to use child restraints). 
 
Study 2 - Expert workshop 
Six road safety experts took part in an expert workshop designed to identify factors 
across the road transport system that influence drivers’ engagement in each of the 
eight behaviours. Potential workshop participants were invited based on their 
previous involvement in research involving the application of a systems thinking 
approach to one of the fatal five behaviours in the Australian context. A summary of 
the participants’ experience in road safety is presented in Table 4. The workshop, 
held over two days, involved reviewing the survey response data for each of the 
eight behaviours, mapped onto Salmon et al.’s (2016) control structure model, and 
then identifying additional contributory factors that the experts believed were 
relevant. First, the two lead authors presented Salmon et al’s control structure 
model to the workshop participants. Taking each behaviour in turn they then 
presented the survey responses overlaid on the control structure model and asked 
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the experts to identify any additional factors that they felt influenced drivers’ 
engagement in the behaviour. This involved a group discussion whereby they 
worked through each level of the model and asked what additional factors might 
play a role in influencing drivers’ engagement in the behaviour in question. When 
the experts agreed that a factor was relevant, they discussed which actors or 
organisations in the model were responsible for the factor in question. When this 
was agreed upon, the factor was placed on the relevant part of the control structure 
model using a sticky note. For example, the factor ‘inadequate enforcement’ was 
deemed to be the responsibility of the Police and so was placed at level 4 of the 
model 
 
 
Table 4. Workshop participant demographics 
Participant Gender Year’s working in the 
area of road safety 
1 M 14 
2 F 11 
3 M 45+ 
4 F 5.5 
5 M 8 
6 F 8 
 
 
 
The factors that workshop participants felt influenced drivers engagement in each of 
the behaviours are presented in Table 5.
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Table 5. Factors identified during the road safety expert workshop that are thought to underpin drivers’ engagement in each fatal five behaviour  
Control structure 
level (refer Fig. 1) 
Fatigue Drink driving Drug driving (illegal) Drug driving (legal) Distraction & Inattention Speeding Failing to wear a 
seatbelt/use of child 
restraints 
 
Overall system  Silos (e.g. between transport planners, urban planners, road safety practitioners, health system and the Police) 
Lack of feedback between coroners, police and the design of road systems 
Crash data limitations (reporting, analysis, dissemination, role in policy and interventions) 
Societal issues Culture of high productivity 
Social acceptance of fatigued 
driving 
Societal drink 
problem/levels of 
consumption 
Societal drug 
problem/levels of 
consumption 
Societal drug problem/levels 
of consumption 
Difficult for authorities to 
keep up with new drugs 
coming into market 
Society’s failure to 
acknowledge the problem 
Societal desire/pressure to 
remain connected 
Saturation of mobile phones 
Whole social environment 
encourages speeding 
“We haven’t won the hearts 
and minds on speed” 
Social norms of not wearing 
seatbelts in other forms of 
transport e.g. buses/taxis 
1 Fatigued less of a govt priority 
compared to other behaviours 
Financial constraints 
around enforcement 
Drug driving less of a govt 
priority compared to other 
behaviours 
Drug driving less of a govt 
priority compared to other 
behaviours 
Lack of clarity around 
responsibility for distraction 
Financial constraints around 
enforcement 
 
Financial constraints around 
enforcement 
 Financial constraints 
around enforcement 
Financial constraints around 
enforcement 
Lack of an independent road 
safety regulator 
  
2 Rules and regulation around 
work-related driving 
Poor urban planning (e.g. 
urban sprawl) 
Failure to gain support 
from Unions for testing 
Failure to gain support from 
Unions for testing 
Limitations in vehicle design 
standards 
Flawed speed limit setting 
process 
Vague/unclear rules 
Financial constraints around 
enforcement 
Lack of facilities for leaving 
vehicles 
Disconnect between OHS 
regulation and work 
driving incidents 
Lack of knowledge on impacts Absence of human factors 
training and education for road 
system designers 
Social media  
Employers not taking 
responsibility for employee 
safety 
Rules and regulation 
around controls e.g. 
interlocks 
Lack of research on safe 
limits 
Financial constraints around 
enforcement 
Vehicle design (e.g. lack of human 
factors integration) 
Financial constraints around 
enforcement 
 
Lack of knowledge on issue Financial constraints 
around enforcement 
Financial constraints 
around enforcement 
Inadequate standards for 
warning labels/patient 
information 
Media and social media 
encouragement to engage in 
distracting behaviours 
  
3 Job design Financial constraints 
around enforcement 
Absence of testing by 
employers 
Absence of testing by 
employers 
Rapid technological advancement 
(integration is lagging) 
Financial constraints around 
enforcement 
Lack of fitting/technical 
advisory service 
Lack of education on risks   Financial constraints 
around enforcement 
Financial constraints around 
enforcement 
Focus of vehicle design on 
integrated media experience 
 Lack of a checking 
mechanism 
Financial constraints around 
enforcement 
  Medical professional reluctant 
to take away drivers’ licences 
e.g. elderly 
Lack of communication and 
interaction between 
organisations/institutions 
  
4 Lack of a fatigue test Inadequate enforcement Inadequate enforcement Absence of prescription drug 
testing 
Inadequate enforcement Inadequate enforcement  
Inadequate enforcement   Inadequate enforcement Lack of school education around 
safe use of mobile phones 
  
5 Absence of feedback 
mechanism 
Perception that it isn’t a 
problem 
Number of people with a 
medical issue around 
alcohol 
Lack/affordability of public 
transport options 
Economic pressures (e.g. 
driving is a necessity for 
employment)  
Lack of rest stops Vehicle design Vehicle design (comfort, lack 
of seatbelt detection 
systems) 
Lack/affordability of public 
transport options 
 Lack of speed cameras Lack/affordability of public 
transport options 
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Survey and workshop data mapped onto control structure 
The factors identified in the survey and expert workshop were mapped onto Salmon 
et al.’s (2016) control structure model. The intention was to identify where the 
factors reside in terms of at which level of the road transport system they are 
created. As shown in Figure 3, the majority of factors reported by drivers were 
related to the lower level of the model (operating process and environment). 
Conversely, most the factors reported by the experts were deemed to reside at the 
higher levels of the road transport system (Levels 1-4).  
 
Societal issues 
The expert group and a small number of the survey respondents identified a series of 
wider societal issues that they felt were impacting driver behaviour. In particular, the 
experts felt that various societal issues underpin drivers’ engagement in drink driving 
(e.g. societal alcohol consumption levels, alcohol addiction), drug driving (e.g. illegal 
and prescription drug misuse and addiction, prescription rates), distracted driving 
(e.g. societal pressure to remain connected, culture of high productivity).  
 
Level 1: Parliament and Legislatures 
At the parliament and legislatures level of the model, the drivers identified the 
setting of unreasonable speed limits as a factor that results in drivers driving above 
the speed limit. The expert group identified a lack of clarity around roles and 
responsibilities for a managing distraction as an issue, suggesting that safety 
responsibilities outside of the drivers themselves are not well defined – for example, 
the responsibility of vehicle manufacturers and mobile phone devices to create 
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designs that limit the potential for distraction. Financial constraints around 
enforcement were also identified by the experts as a factor that results in less 
enforcement on the road and more opportunity for drivers to get away with 
behaviours such as drink and drug driving and not wearing a seatbelt. The experts 
also cited the fact that certain behaviours are prioritised over others as an issue. For 
example, they suggested more well-known and identifiable behaviours (i.e. through 
roadside testing) such as drink driving are prioritised over more recently emerging 
and less identifiable behaviours such as driving while fatigued.  
 
Level 2: Government agencies, user groups, industry associations, courts  
At the government agencies level of the model, the drivers identified the cost of 
fitting child restraints as a factor that prevents some drivers from using them. The 
expert group identified various factors at this level, including limitations in vehicle 
design standards, financial constraints around enforcement, a flawed speed limit 
setting process (leading to inappropriate speed limits), vague and unclear road rules. 
An interesting group of factors reported by the experts at this level included factors 
which facilitate the need to drive. These included poor urban planning leading to 
urban sprawl and a lack of facilities for leaving vehicles (e.g. overnight). Another 
group of factors related to the lack of human factors integration in the design of the 
road environment, vehicles, and devices. Here the experts felt that there is a lack of 
human factors training for road system designers and poor human factors 
integration in vehicle design. Finally, factors related to work-related driving were 
also identified. These included unions resistance to testing (e.g. drugs, fatigue), the 
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rules and regulations around work-related driving, and a disconnect between 
occupational health and safety regulation and work-related driving incidents. 
 
Level 3: Operational delivery and management 
None of the drivers reported any factors at the operational delivery and 
management level of the model; however, the experts identified ten factors at this 
level. Again, work-related driving issues featured at this level, with an absence of 
drug/alcohol/fatigue testing by employees and job design both reported as factors 
that might influence drivers engagement in behaviours such as driving while 
fatigued. Also reported at this level were rapid technological advances with which 
road safety authorities cannot keep pace as well as the focus of vehicle designers on 
providing drivers with an integrated media experience. Poor support for fitting and 
maintaining child restraints was also highlighted with the lack of a child restraint 
fitting services and checking mechanism reported by the experts as impacting the 
appropriate use of child restraints. Other factors reported by the experts at this level 
included a lack of education on risks associated with certain behaviours such as 
fatigue, and financial constraints around enforcement. 
 
Level 4: Local management and supervision 
At level 4 of the model the drivers reported four factors (drivers' perception that 
they will not be caught, work requirements, shift work, and family and social 
expectations) whereas the experts identified five (inadequate enforcement, absence 
of roadside testing for prescription drugs and fatigue, lack of school education 
around safe mobile phone use, and economic pressures on individuals). 
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Interestingly, a number of the factors reported at this level relate to the likelihood of 
drivers being caught when engaging in the eight behaviours. These included drivers’ 
perceptions that they would not be caught which are created by low levels of 
enforcement and the lack of roadside testing for behaviours such as driving while 
fatigued or under the influence of prescription drugs). 
 
Level 5: Operating process and environment 
The majority of the factors reported by drivers at level 5 of the model (Operating 
process and driving environment) were driver-centric and relate specifically to the 
drivers themselves (e.g. complacency, emotions/stress, stupidity, addiction, 
impatience). The experts did identify additional factors at this level including vehicle 
design, a lack of speed cameras, the affordability of alternative transport options, 
and a lack of safe rest stops. 
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Figure 3. Driver survey and expert workshop findings overlaid on Salmon et al’s (2016) control 
structure levels. 
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Discussion 
This study was designed to investigate driver and road safety expert perceptions on 
the system-wide factors underpinning drivers’ engagement in eight behaviours 
known to lead to fatal road crashes. Based on a survey of driver behaviour and an 
expert workshop, contributory factors were identified and mapped onto Salmon et 
al.’s (2016) Qld road transport system control structure.  
 
Engagement in behaviours known to lead to crashes 
Over two-thirds of participants reported that they had driven while distracted and 
fatigued and three-quarters had knowingly driven over the speed limit. This is in 
comparison with the lower levels of reported engagement in more ostensibly 
unacceptable behaviours such as drink driving (32%), driving under the influence of 
illegal (10%) and legal drugs (12%) and not wearing a seatbelt (23%).  
 
The reported engagement in speeding, driver distraction and driving while fatigued 
is similar to those found in recent Australian studies. In a survey study of Victorian 
drivers, 56% of participants reported exceeding the posted speed limit in one or 
more speed zones (Stephens et al., 2017). Previous research has also found that 
around 60% of drivers report having driven whilst using a mobile phone (Young and 
Lenné, 2010). In relation to fatigue, a survey study of almost 1000 Australian drivers 
found that close to 80% reported that they had previously driven while sleepy, a 
state related to fatigue (Obst et al., 2011). In a sample of over 1600 New South 
Wales and Australian Capital Territory drivers, 66% reported having experienced 
driving while fatigued/sleepy (Armstrong et al., 2013). These findings suggest that 
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speeding, distraction and inattention, and fatigue are the most commonly engaged 
in behaviours of those known to lead to crashes and trauma in Australia. 
 
The findings indicate that drivers perceive the majority of factors that contribute to 
drivers engaging in the eight behaviours to be driver-centric (i.e. they relate 
specifically to driver characteristics). Across the behaviours, the majority of factors 
reported via the survey related to drivers and aspects of their personality, 
knowledge and experience, or psychological state. Commonly reported factors 
included stupidity/ignorance, emotions and stress, lack of understanding of risks, 
impairment, complacency or optimism bias, and laziness. Although survey 
participants did report a selection of factors related to the wider road transport 
system and even society more generally, the findings suggest that drivers believe 
that engagement in the behaviours is predominantly a driver-centric problem. This 
suggests that there may be some benefit in educating road users about the broader 
set of factors that can potentially influence their behaviour. A better understanding 
of these influences may enable road users to proactively manage certain factors and 
ensure that they do not have an adverse influence on their driving behaviours.  
 
The factors identified during the expert workshop covered all levels of the road 
transport system as defined by Salmon et al. (2016). Most relate to issues and 
conditions within the broader road system and society that were thought to directly 
or indirectly influence driver behaviour. This set of factors relate to road 
infrastructure and vehicle design, road rules and regulations, standards, budgetary 
constraints, the media and social media, public transport infrastructure, research, 
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enforcement, work-related driving, and advances in technological capability. These 
factors point to the role that actors other than drivers play in road trauma and 
identify areas that could benefit from interventions. 
 
An important finding was the reported role that wider societal problems play in 
creating the behaviours known to lead to crashes. Workshop participants felt that 
engagement in certain behaviours is underpinned by societal issues largely beyond 
the control of road safety stakeholders. For example, driving under the influence of 
illegal or legal drugs is an emerging road safety problem (Department of Transport 
and Main Roads, 2016; Horniak et al., 2017; Malhotra et al., 2017; Smyth et al., 2013; 
World Health Organisation, 2016) that is underpinned by the societal issue of drug 
addiction. Road safety authorities attempt to manage drug driving through 
regulation, enforcement, and education campaigns (World Health Organisation, 
2016); however, although drug drivers are caught and proceed through the courts on 
traffic offences, they are not typically rehabilitated through road safety 
interventions. Further, road safety stakeholders have little control over the wider 
societal issues that contribute to drug misuse and addiction. As long as the societal 
issues co-exist with a strong reliance on motor vehicles for transport there will 
continue to be a flow of drug affected users into the road transport system.  
 
The same principle applies for other fatal five behaviours which, according to the 
expert group, are underpinned by societal issues. For example, drink driving rates 
are influenced by increasing levels of alcohol consumption. Engagement in 
distracting activities while driving is influenced by an increasing societal pressure to 
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remain connected through technology. Speeding and driving while fatigued are 
issues that are exacerbated by increasingly time poor lifestyles and work pressures. 
Indeed, the requirement to drive a car in the first place is driven by low-density 
urban form and lack of viable public transport (Stevenson et al, 2016). These findings 
are mirrored by Hughes et al. (2016) who argue that existing road safety strategies 
cannot cope with the impact that societal issues have on road safety (Hughes et al., 
2016). A clear implication is that road safety strategy and policy needs to consider 
the broader societal system in which road transport sits. 
 
The findings also provide further evidence that an integrated public health approach 
is required to achieve further road safety gains. Recent research has demonstrated 
that an integrated approach to public health, urban planning and transport safety is 
likely to achieve greater public health and road safety gains than the current ‘siloed’ 
approach (McClure et al., 2015). Further, road safety researchers have suggested 
that a more integrated approach is required to drive culture change (e.g. Johnston, 
2010). With drug driving, for example, road safety stakeholders should coordinate 
their activities with those tackling drug misuse and addiction. In the case of 
medication and prescription drugs, government, the media, drug manufacturers, 
pharmaceutical companies, doctors, healthcare providers, road safety authorities 
and the police should all be working together to tackle drug addiction and misuse 
and reduce the number of drivers driving under the influence. This is not 
straightforward, however, as these groups have differing goals, methods and 
performance indicators. An important first step would therefore be to attempt to 
integrate their goals and methods into a coordinated approach. This could be 
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underpinned by a shared philosophy that drug addiction be treated by all 
stakeholders as a medical issue. This would involve doctors attempting to reduce 
prescriptions, addiction and misuse through offering alternative pain treatments or 
educating patients about the possibility of addiction, monitoring patients, and 
offering rehabilitation when required. Likewise, police could modify their 
enforcement approach to offer medical services and treatment (if required) when 
they apprehend intoxicated drivers. Other stakeholders such as pharmaceutical 
companies could also work to improve drug-warning labels to educate users on the 
possibility of addiction and on the dangers of driving under the influence. Without a 
coordinated approach, road safety-based interventions are likely to only have 
marginal impacts, and the societal issues will continue to drive unsafe driving 
behaviours. 
 
Practical implications 
Regarding factors that road safety stakeholders can control, the findings have 
implications for preventing engagement in the eight behaviours examined. Many of 
the driver-centric contributory factors identified will continue to be tackled by 
through standard avenues such as driver education, enforcement and driver training, 
however, the findings suggest that interventions aimed at the higher levels of road 
transport systems will also be beneficial. For example, some of the factors relating to 
driving while distracted suggest that improvements to design standards for both 
mobile phones and in-vehicle devices are required (Young et al., 2015). Further, 
improved human factors integration within vehicle design would heighten the 
consideration of the potential distracting effects of in-vehicle devices. This could be 
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achieved through the inclusion of human factors expertise or through providing 
human factors training to vehicle and device designers. Improved human factors 
integration could also be driven through regulatory change to require human 
centred design processes to be used in the development of vehicles and in-vehicle 
devices. While this is difficult to achieve at a national level given that Australia 
imports vehicles designed and built overseas, it can be achieved through 
international regulation and standards in a similar manner to the aviation and 
maritime industries.  
 
A further implication is that it may be useful for road safety stakeholders to develop 
multiple integrated interventions that span all levels of the road transport system. 
This can be achieved by considering how lower level interventions can be driven by 
changes to the higher levels of the road transport system. For example, in the case 
of distraction increased education and enforcement at the lower level should be 
integrated with changes to vehicle and device design standards and processes as 
well as changes to road safety strategy designed to enable road safety authorities to 
keep pace with technological change. This integrated network of interventions 
approach provides a means of optimising the overall road system rather than merely 
parts in isolation. 
 
The findings also suggest that there may also be a need to consider new approaches 
to enforcement. Both the drivers and experts reported various factors related to 
enforcement that facilitates a belief in drivers that they will not be caught when 
engaging in each of the behaviours. Further, the experts suggested that a key 
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challenge lies in reaching the small number of drivers who do not respond to the 
threat of standard enforcement (i.e. repeat offenders). In the case of drink driving, 
for example, repeat offenders have been shown to be more likely than those who 
have not offended to be involved in fatal crashes and fatal hit-and-run collisions with 
pedestrians, and to have high blood alcohol concentrations when driving (Lapham et 
al., 2006). Further research is needed to understand the factors influencing the 
behaviours of these repeat offenders and to design new types of enforcement or 
initiatives specifically for them. It may be, for example, that stronger controls are 
required for this group (Salmon et al., 2016).  
 
A final important implication relates to the crash data systems that are currently 
used in road transport systems. In combination with other studies (e.g. Newnam and 
Goode, 2015) the findings suggests that there are important crash contributory 
factors that reside at the higher levels of road transport systems. Despite this, most 
crash data systems typically only identify contributory factors related to drivers, 
their vehicles, and the road environment, with little information available regarding 
less direct contributory factors residing at the higher levels of the system (Salmon et 
al., 2016). Whilst the present study suggests that there are important factors outside 
of the driver, vehicle and road environment that play a role in crashes, there appears 
to be no data available to investigate specifically their role in crashes. The 
development of systems thinking-based crash data collection and analysis systems is 
a key future research requirement that has previously been articulated (e.g. Salmon 
et al., 2016) and is one that is further emphasised through this study. Similar systems 
have been developed in other domains and have resulted in advances in the 
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knowledge base around the contributory factors involved in adverse events (see 
Salmon et al., 2017).  
 
Study limitations and areas for further research 
This study had some important limitations. First, both the survey and workshop had 
small sample sizes which potentially impacts the generalisability of the results. 
Further surveys with larger sample sizes along with a larger group of experts would 
remove this limitation (e.g. Armstrong et al., 2013; Stephens et al., 2017). A useful 
future study would be to repeat the current study in all Australian states with larger 
survey and expert workshop sample sizes. Second, the survey or expert workshop 
did not seek to identify relationships between different contributory factors. This is 
an important omission given the systems thinking philosophy that all accidents are 
caused by an interacting network of contributory factors. A future study should 
investigate how the different contributory factors identified interact with one 
another to create road trauma. Third, the extent to which contributory factors 
differed across participants describing their own engagement in the fatal five 
behaviours compared to participants describing other drivers’ engagement in the 
fatal five behaviours was not examined. This was beyond the scope of the present 
study but would be useful to examine in a future study. A final area for further 
research that was beyond the scope of this study and article is to investigate 
differences in the factors reported across participants of differing socio-demographic 
characteristics such as age, gender and driving experience.  
 
Conclusion 
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This study has added to the growing consensus that road trauma is created by a web 
of interacting factors that span all levels of road transport systems. It is concluded 
that there are a range of diverse factors that potentially influence drivers’ 
engagement in the fatal five behaviours that are known to play a direct causal role in 
road crashes. Whilst many of these factors reside within the road transport system, 
wider societal issues also have a key influence on driver behaviour. A consideration 
of the contributory factors and societal issues identified is urged when developing 
road safety strategy, policy, and interventions. 
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